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THE CURIOUS CASE OF CORPORATE CRIMINALITY
Erik Luna*
INTRODUCTION
Corporations dominate the business world, accounting for an overwhelming
majority of commercial revenues and serving as the nearly exclusive organiza-
tional form for large-scale enterprise.1 They are, quite simply, the major vehicles
of American capitalism and a primary source of socio-economic prosperity and
innovation. But corporations are also implicated in serious harm to individuals and
society: massive fraud in securities, banking, and health care; damage to the
environment from air and water pollution and the generation of hazardous waste;
and systematic bribery, tax evasion, and obstruction of justice. If these acts were
committed by an individual, there would be little doubt that prosecution and
punishment might be in store - and, indeed, contemporary law accepts the idea that
corporations can be held criminally liable in such circumstances. Yet to this day
corporate criminality remains a curious concept. As artificial creatures of the law,
corporations per se have no emotions or culpable mental states. Nor are they
subject to incarceration, the primary mode of punishment in America. To use the
hoary phrase, there is "no soul to damn, no body to kick.",2
This symposium brings together leading scholars to explore the past, present,
and future of corporate criminal law. The following response will offer some brief
observations about several written contributions, all of which, I believe, help
elucidate the peculiar institution of corporate crime.
I. DEODAND AND FRANKPLEDGE
Professor Albert Alschuler's article takes issue with the very idea of corpora-
tions being convicted and sentenced like human defendants.3 The modem doctrine
traces back to 1909 and the (in)famous New York Central case, where the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld corporate punishment based on the respondeat superior
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. Many thanks to Christopher Bruner for his
comments, and to Thomas J. Moran for his research assistance. © 2009, Erik Luna.
1. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHoPER, JoHN C. CoFFEE, JR. & RoNALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
COmORATIONS 1 (6th ed. 2004); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CoIpoRATE LAW 1-2 (1986).
2. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem
of Corporate Punishment, 79 MicH. L. REv. 386, 386 (1981) (attributing the phrase to The Lord Chancellor of
England, Baron Thurlow, in the eighteenth century); see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, 7vo Ways to Think About the
Punishment of Corporations, 46 Am. CRIm. L. Ray. 1366 n.488 (2009) (noting that the oft-quoted phrase has not
been tracked to a primary source); see generally Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate
Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1387-95 (2008).
3. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1366.
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theory of tort law, thereby allowing a corporation to be held criminally liable for its
agents' actions taken within the scope of their employment.4 Although the Court
suggested that "there are some crimes which in their nature cannot be committed
by corporations,"5 Alschuler correctly notes that the opinion itself provided no
guidance as to the boundaries of corporate criminality. In the ensuing decades,
lawmakers and jurists have rejected most meaningful limits to the doctrine6 and
allowed corporations to be held liable not only for modem financial offenses but
also for serious physical crimes (e.g., homicide).7 Still, corporate criminal liability
is an oddity, regardless of any approval or acquiescence by courts, politicians, and
the public. Akin to saying "I love you" to an inflatable, it sounds strange to
describe a corporation as a manslaughterer'
Alschuler exposes the foibles of this practice through analogy to two ancient
institutions. The first is deodand, a biblically derived custom of punishing
inanimate objects or animals involved in the killing of human beings. British
common law permitted actions against chattel, which if found to have caused a
person's death, would be forfeited to the Crown. The tradition of suing non-human
entities continued after the American Revolution, sometimes in the form of a
distinct doctrine that allowed ships to be seized without having to bring their
owners within the jurisdiction.9 But whether the fiction was grounded in deodand
or admiralty law, the courts were acquiescing to a type of "transcendental
4. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909). See, e.g., Thomas
Bernard, The Historical Background of Corporate Criminal Liability, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1984) (discussing
historical development of corporate liability); Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief
History and an Observation, 60 WASH U. L. Q. 393 (1982) (same).
5. New York Central, 212 U.S at 494.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2009) (refusing to limit criminal
liability to cases where the corporation lacked effective policies and procedures to deter and detect employees'
criminal actions).
7. See, e.g., Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of San Mateo County, 24 Cal. App. 4th 446, 456-59 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (negligent homicide); Vaughan and Sons, Inc. v. Texas, 737 S.W.2d 805, 814 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (same); Kathleen F. Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal Homicide, 2 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETmICS & PuB. POL'Y 753, 753 (1987); Crsar de Castro, Sorting Out the Law on Homicide
Prosecutions Against Corporations, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 19, 2009).
8. As compared to, for instance, Don King. See, e.g., JACK NEWFIELD, THE LIFE AND CRIMES OF DON KING
13-29 (2003) (describing manslaughter conviction). See generally JOHN HAGAN, CRIME AND DISREPUTE 108
(1994):
[U]ntil recently, the dominant precedent ... has been that corporations are incapable of forming
the criminal intent that is necessary to constitute a provable crime like homicide against a person.
Also, in many state and federal statutes, homicide is defined as the criminal slaying of "another
human being," with "another" referring to the same class of being as the victim. These precedents
and statutes together have acted to diminish the plausibility of the idea that corporations can, in a
criminal sense, kill people.
9. See, e.g., Michael Schecter, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1151, 1154
(1990).
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nonsense,''°  to use Felix Cohen's phrase: property is treated as a person,
denominated a party to litigation, and adjudicated guilty of wrongdoing. The
fiction persists to this day and has facilitated some unconscionable results, like the
forfeiture of an innocent woman's car because her husband had used it for a tryst
with a prostitute."
Alschuler describes a second institution, frankpledge, which is "less silly than
hating an artificial person." 12 Dating back to the Norman conquest of England, the
practice held the male leaders of ten households responsible for keeping the peace
within their community, and in particular, it required them to deliver any house-
hold member who had committed a crime. If he was not produced, all leaders
could be fined regardless of whether the offender was part of their specific
household, thus establishing collective liability for an individual's wrongdoing. In
a sense, frankpledge was a mirror image of the older, far more brutal institution of
"decimation" associated with the Roman army. If a large number of soldiers acted
with cowardice, a tenth of the group could be drawn by lot and then executed.'3 In
more recent history, a World War II Soviet commander utilized the practice against
troops who had retreated during the battle of Stalingrad. 14
Whatever the historical analogy, however, Alschuler considers the modem
doctrine of corporate criminal liability to be a form of collective punishment
without concern for individual culpability:
[C]riminal punishment cannot really be borne by a fictional entity [such as a
corporation].... This punishment is inflicted instead on human beings whose
guilt remains unproven. Innocent shareholders pay the fines, and innocent
employees, creditors, customers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch
too. The embarrassment of corporate criminal liability is that it punishes the
innocent along with the guilty.' 5
All told, Alschuler's article provides a compelling case against corporate
criminal liability, illuminating its problems with provocative metaphors. My only
question is whether a meaningful distinction can be drawn between a blameless
person affected by corporate punishment and an equally innocent individual
harmed by any other form of criminal sentencing. According to Alschuler,
shareholders and employees supposedly receive penalties that "are not incidental,
10. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLuimi. L. REv. 809, 809
(1935).
11. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443, 453 (1996).
12. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1377.
13. See, e.g., SARA ELISE PHANG, RoMAN MILITARY SERvICE: IDEOLOGIES OF DisciwuNE iN THE LATE REPuaLIc
AND EARLY PRiNcIPATE 123-29 (2008).
14. See ANroNY BEEVOR, STALINGRAD: THE FATEFUL SiEGE: 1942-1943, at 117 (1999) (discussing how the
divisional commander adopted the Roman punishment of decimation, walking along the front rank counting and
shooting every tenth man).
15. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1367-68.
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collateral, or secondary"' 6 to corporate punishment, and yet there is no definitive
test or set of criteria to differentiate between, for example, primary and secondary
effects. The case caption provides one crude standard: if your name is in the
heading - say, People v. Smith, and you happen to be Smith - then any adverse
consequence imposed on you is aptly described as a primary, direct, and inten-
tional result of the proceeding. Other than that, however, the distinctions tend to be
contextual rather than categorical. Frankly, I am not at all sure why the "penalty"
inflicted upon a former Enron security officer is different in kind from that
imposed on the erstwhile bodyguard for an incarcerated celebrity. Both have lost
their jobs and may experience the stigma of having worked for a convicted
criminal.
Some might contend that criminal liability is a natural extension of the original
legal fiction of corporate jurisprudence, where corporations are considered persons
in the eyes of the law. This anthropomorphizing of business entities provides
tangible benefits for those who interact with corporations. Shareholders in particu-
lar receive unique advantages, chief among them, limited liability for corporate
conduct: as long as an investor remains a passive provider of capital, he risks only
his investment and can neither be civilly sued nor criminally prosecuted for the
misdeeds of the corporation. 17 In fact, his exposure may be less than that of other
types of equity holders. In business forms lacking a liability shield (e.g., sole
proprietorships), owners may be held personally liable for all sorts of wrongdoing,
including the misconduct of their employees (i.e., vicarious liability) and some-
times in the absence of a culpable mental state (i.e., strict liability). Such equity
owners are the business, so to speak, and thus responsible for offenses committed
under its guise. In contrast, a shareholder cannot be held liable for corporate crime
unless he was more than a mere owner of stock (e.g., he was also an executive
involved in the criminal activity). By the act of incorporation, a business becomes
a separate entity from its owners; "and no corporation can, by violating a law,
make any one of its stockholders who does not himself participate in that violation
16. Id. at 14.
17. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1994):
[T]he activity required to pierce the veil goes well beyond the typical shareholder role as a passive
provider of capital. Courts generally refuse to impose liability on shareholders unless they have
control of the corporation and there has been misuse of the corporate form, such as fraud,
undercapitalization, or intermingling of corporate and individual transactions. My study of 1600
piercing-the-veil cases found no case in which shareholders in a public corporation were held
liable and no civil case in which individual shareholders identified as passive in corporations of
any size were held liable. Most successful piercing cases in the study involved individuals who
served as both shareholders and managers or corporate groups in which the parent corporation was
the shareholder and could name the individuals who managed the subsidiary.
Cf Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 387 (2d Cir. 1989). See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER,
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (1991).
[Vol. 46:15071510
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criminally liable therefor."' 8 All of this might be viewed as an implicit deal for
shareholders: as long as an investor remains passive, uninvolved in day-to-day
corporate operations, his exposure is capped at the value of the stock. If the
corporation is convicted of crime, however, any complaint that "innocent" share-
holders are being unfairly punished will fall on deaf ears.
This may seem harsh, no doubt, and I have serious misgivings about the above
characterization. Like Alschuler, I am not a fan of corporate'criminal liability,
which should be scrapped in favor of the jurisprudentially sound approach of
prosecuting individuals for their crimes and holding businesses liable in tort.
Moreover, a corporate case may have derivative effects that are more widespread
than an individual prosecution. It is hard to deny that the collapse of Arthur
Anderson had an aggregate impact far greater than the downfall of a lone
businessman. But on the individual level of injured parties, the harm may be the
same regardless of its source. The putative victim of corporate prosecution does
not have an inherently superior claim of innocence or beef about undeserved
punishment vis-A-vis the families, work relations, and communities affected by
severe sentences for non-corporate crime.
II. THE BANALY OF CORPORATE CRvMINAL LIABLITY
This last point is central to Professor Sara Sun Beale's symposium article, ' 9
which offers a potent rejoinder to the many critics of corporate criminal liability,
including Alschuler. According to Beale, corporate criminal liability is far from
unique. The argument in favor of using civil or administrative sanctions in lieu of
criminal punishment, for instance, could apply to a wide range of crimes, not just
corporate wrongdoing. Similarly, she provides several doctrinal examples where
individuals, like corporations, can be held criminally liable in the absence of moral
blameworthiness, while also suggesting that the problems of prosecutorial discre-
tion, excessive punishment, and collateral consequences are endemic to U.S.
criminal justice. More generally, Beale rejects the prevailing depiction of corpora-
tions as fictions. "Rather, they are enormously powerful - and very real - actors
whose conduct often causes very significant harms both to individuals and to
18. Union Pac. Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1909); see, e.g., 18 C.J.S. Corporations
§ 517 (2009) ("Inasmuch as a distinct legal entity is created when a company is incorporated, no corporation can
by violating a law make any one of its stockholders who does not personally have knowledge of or participate in
that violation criminally liable for it."); Distinctness of corporate entity-Crimes and penalties, 1 FLErcHER Cvc.
CoRP. § 34 (2009) ("The same rules apply to shareholder liability for corporate crimes as apply to corporate torts;
shareholders are not personally guilty of crimes committed by the corporation, or ascribed to it, unless it can be
proven that they personally participated."). It should be noted, however, that there are non-corporate business
forms that limit the liability of equity owners, such as the limited liability company (LLC) and the limited
partnership (LP).
19. See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1481
(2009) [hereinafter Beale, Response].
2009]
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society as a whole. 2 ° She emphasizes the wealth of major corporations, their clout
in the political process, and the damage they can do in excess of individual
misconduct. The argument in favor of corporate criminal liability is bolstered by
the recent experience in western industrial nations. Many of America's peers have
introduced statutory grounds for corporate punishment, expanded the legal bases
for liability, and made it easier to prosecute corporations, all of which Beale sees as
a rebuke of those who oppose corporate criminal liability.
On the whole, Beale makes a powerful case for maintaining much of the current
doctrine on corporate criminality. While I disagree with many of her claims and
conclusions, ours is a difference of opinion where both sides have merit and
deserve a full airing. Persuasive counterarguments can be mustered from Alschul-
er's article and the works by other critics of corporate criminal liability. Here I
broach only a few points of contention, beginning with the assertion that a
corporation is not a fiction. Beale may have used the phrase in a more colloquial
sense,2 1 in which case she has a point: corporations are not altogether ethereal but
instead pervaded by material aspects, from the buildings that serve as corporate
headquarters to the machinery that produces commercial goods. If, however, the
word is employed as a term of art, then a corporation is a legal fiction - "an
assumption that something is true even though it may be untrue' 22 - where, as
mentioned, a non-human entity is treated as a person under law.2 3 Neither
describing it as an "actor" nor ascribing to it great harm changes a corporation into
an actual human. Automobiles may be involved in millions of injuries each year,
but only Disney can give cars the qualities of human beings. Although this ends the
debate for me - only humans can possess a culpable mens rea, for example, and
may thus be morally blameworthy for their actions - many others, maybe most
Americans, would disagree, believing that corporate criminal liability is justifi-
able. But to be convincing, the argument would have to be premised on some sort
of utilitarian formula, not the alchemic conversion of legal fictions into demon-
strable facts.
Perhaps the key question for such calculus will be the relative harm to
individuals, including the injury to innocent people. If Alschuler seems to give too
much weight to the undeserved suffering from corporate punishment as compared
to third-party harms in other cases, Beale does not seem to acknowledge the
aforementioned difference in impact between corporate and individual punish-
ment. Beale is absolutely correct that drug enforcement has had a devastating
effect on individual defendants, families, and communities. As I have argued
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., MERRLA-WEsTER's COLLFGIATE DIcnONARY 465 (11th ed. 2003) (defining "fiction" as
"something invented by the imagination or feigned").
22. BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 913 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "legal fiction").
23. Courts and legislatures have long accepted this legal fiction. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,636 (1819).
[Vol. 46:15071512
HeinOnline  -- 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1512 2009
THE Cuious CASE OF CORPORATE CRIMIUNALITY
elsewhere, there is no area of American criminal justice that is in greater need of
reform than drug prohibition.24 But if we focus on individual cases, there is an
undeniable difference in third-party harms from prosecuting a person versus a
major corporation. If an individual is convicted and punished for a drug offense,
the family may be deprived financial and emotional support, his lawful employer
may lose a trusted worker, and the community may surrender one of its members.
But if a corporation is the target, literally thousands of people may lose their jobs,
customers may be denied their source of goods and services, and entire communi-
ties may be destroyed. Beale downplays collateral consequences because they
have "no necessary relationship to the question of the corporation's criminal
liability. ' 25 But the ostensibly collateral consequences of a drug conviction might
be all that matters to the defendant, who may become ineligible for government
grants, may lose his professional license or be unable to find employment, may
have his child custody arrangements negatively affected, and so on. Although
corporations don't have children, they do have employees who may face unemploy-
ment as a collateral consequence of any corporate prosecution and subsequent
business failure.
This brings us to the issues of prosecutorial discretion and comparative analysis.
As for the former, Beale contends that if prosecutors have too much power, it is a
problem endemic to the entire criminal justice system rather than corporate crimes
alone. Today, it is scarcely debatable that prosecutors exercise vast and largely
unchecked discretion at each stage of the criminal process.26 Likewise, most agree
that this discretion is subject to outrageous abuses, due to the belligerent nature of
American adversarialism, the politicization of the criminal justice system, and the
self-interests of prosecutors, whose success and career prospects are often mea-
sured by the quantity and notoriety of their convictions.27 The fact that abuses of
discretion may occur in any criminal case is not a particularly compelling
argument against limiting it in one category. Indeed, a corporate prosecution may
multiply the concerns raised by discretionary decision-making, due to the large
number of innocent parties that could be impacted and the potentially distortive
self-interests in pursuing a major corporation. As for the lessons of comparative
analysis, Beale believes developments in other nations demonstrate that corporate
criminal liability is not "an outdated historical vestige' 28 without a valid role in
modem jurisprudence. I do not doubt that the basis for corporate prosecutions has
24. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Drug Ditente, 20 FED. SENT. R. 304 (2008) (arguing that a review of national drug
prohibition should be a top priority for the new administration).
25. Beale, Response, supra note 19, at 1500.
26. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Prosecutorial Discretion, 6 Os4O ST. J. CwM. L. 367, 367 (2009).
27. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, AD vERsARiAL LE.AtsM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 85-86 (2001); Sara
Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 Oto ST. J. Cim. L. 369,373-90 (2009);
Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 125, 134-35 (2004).
28. Beale, Response, supra note 19, at 1494.
2009] 1513
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expanded in Western Europe; the question for me, however, is whether this
development justifies the amount of discretion exercised by American prosecutors
in corporate cases.
Despite the apparent convergence of criminal justice systems, 29 significant
differences remain between the prosecutorial function in the United States and in
Europe.3 ° Continental prosecutors regard themselves as judicial officers who apply
the law as a science and find the truth through rational analysis. They accept the job
as an end itself, rather than a means to a high-paying position with a private law
firm, and their status as representatives of the public interest is unencumbered by
raw politics. Accountability comes through hierarchy, guidelines, the review of
superior prosecutors, and the desire to conform to role conceptions, imbued by a
collegial environment of high professional ethics. Pressures do exist, especially the
sometimes overwhelming quantity of cases that must be disposed of. But unlike
the United States, the number and rate of convictions and the amount of
punishment are not the basic measures of success. The judicial-minded goals of
finding the truth and achieving just outcomes are paramount, affecting oversight of
police investigations, the preparation of case files, the exercise of case-ending
discretion, the presentation of evidence, and all other aspects of the prosecutorial
function. This is not to say that determining the "objective truth" is (always)
possible or that European prosecutors "get it right" every time. However, the legal
culture, the education and training, and the hierarchy and expectations of prosecu-
tors all shape their self-perception and practice. These soft factors constrain
European prosecutors as much as any hard legal limit. So although corporate
criminal liability may have increased in peer nations, the merits of which can be
debated as a theoretical matter, abusive decision-making in corporate prosecutions
may be less of a concern in Western Europe than in the United States.
I
1H1. CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Like Beale, Professor Pamela Bucy offers several arguments in support of
corporate criminal liability, beginning with the extensive harm that such entities
can inflict upon individuals and society in general. 31 That danger is heightened by
business norms and structures that emphasize success by any means, a level of
tolerance for legal violations, and employee ignorance as to the full range of
29. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law Model of Criminal
Procedure, 7 CRim. L.F. 471-72 (1996).
30. The following analysis comes from Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges (unpublished
manuscript). See also Shawn Marie Boyne, Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany's Rechtsstaat: Varieties of
Practice and the Pursuit of Truth (2007) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin 2007); Markus Dirk Dubber,
The Promise of German Criminal Law: A Science of Crime and Punishment, 6 GERmAN L.J. 1049, 1049 (2005),
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=613; cf MIRjAN R. DAMASKA, THE FAcES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AuTHoRrrY (1986).
31. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1437, 1437-38 (2009) (discussing the importance of criminally prosecuting corporations for the harm inflicted).
1514 [Vol. 46:1507
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corporate activities. Bucy also notes some aspects of corporate entities that may
encourage government use of the criminal sanction, like the deterrent value of
punishing corporate executives and the relative ease of prosecuting the corporation
rather individual actors. But Bucy also provides reasons not to prosecute corpora-
tions. Similar to Alschuler, she recognizes that corporate punishment can have a
detrimental impact on employees, shareholders, customers, and others, the vast
majority of whom may be innocent of any wrongdoing. In addition, the breadth of
prosecutorial discretion in this area may hinder business innovation and valuable
risk-taking. Punishment becomes especially tenuous when the government is not
required to prove knowledge of the violation and a duty to comply with the
regulations, or worse yet, when corporate executives have done everything within
their power to ensure legal compliance.
32
Given the various arguments for and against corporate criminal liability, Bucy
presents a skillfully drafted legislative proposal and concomitant amendment to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, attempting to strike a new balance
between the power of the prosecutor and the exculpatory claims of the corporate
defendant. Specifically, she articulates an affirmative defense to criminal liability
where "the entity demonstrates that at the time of the offense it had in place an
effective corporate compliance program relevant to any crimes committed.",33 The
article concludes with a list of elements for an effective corporate compliance plan
- for example, a training program for directors, executives, and other employees
on their compliance-related obligations - followed by a discussion about what
should be done when a violation occurs.
Bucy's proposal comports with the suggestions of others in favor of a corporate
compliance defense.34 In fact, it builds upon judicial precedents and legal scholar-
ship, the policies of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Department of Justice,
and the prophylactic practices of corporations trying to avoid criminal liability.
35
The proposal makes eminent sense, and I pause here only to raise a pair of
concerns, one regarding the body of crimes for which corporations may be liable
and the other about the possibility that any reform in this area will be adopted. As
for the former, there are many in the world of law and business (as well as at least a
few academics) who suspect that the general class of white-collar offending,
32. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that a
corporation is liable under the Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in the scope of their employment, even
though contrary to general corporate policy and express instructions to the agent); see also Bucy, supra note 31, at
6.
33. Bucy, supra note 31, at 1446.
34. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1392 (arguing that the goal is to induce internal corporate monitoring).
35. See id. at 1392 (listing factors that encourage compliance programs such as the U.S. Attorney's Manual, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the rules of several administrative agencies, and the corporation law of
Delaware); Bucy, supra note 31, at 1443-46 (referring to the Sentencing Guidelines' steep sentence reduction for
any organization that had an effective compliance and ethics program in place at the time of offense, and the U.S.
Department of Justice's direction to federal prosecutors to consider the "existence and effectiveness of the
corporation's pre-existing compliance program" before indicting).
2009] 1515
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including corporate crime, often lacks the element of harmful wrongdoing and
therefore has no place in a decent penal code. 36 Nearly a half-century ago,
Professor Sanford Kadish noted that some regulatory crime "resembles acceptable
aggressive business behavior" without moral stigma.3 7 Not only does it appear
indistinguishable from ordinary business activity, but the relevant conduct may be
"affirmatively desirable in an economy founded upon an ideology ... of free
enterprise and the profit motive.",38 To this day, it is still debatable whether
anti-trust violations and insider trading, for instance, are sufficiently reprehensible
to justify criminal sanctions. 39 An affirmative defense may have no impact on the
overcriminalization of business activity and only a limited effect on corporate
precautions, and some might argue that a defense could entrench dubious laws or
impede perfectly legal, productive endeavors by encouraging corporations to steer
far wide of the relevant activity.
The second concern is practical, whether an affirmative defense for corporations
is viable in the wake of some of the most dramatic financial scandals in U.S.
history. The Enron debacle infuriated many American citizens, as did Bernard
Madoff's mass investment scam. These incidents and others like them - such as
the accounting fraud of Adelphia and WorldCom, and the investment shenanigans
of the Stanford Financial Group - may shock the public and even provoke calls for
reform, often with little thought about the status of white-collar crime (or more
narrowly, corporate crime) or analogous instances of misconduct in the past.
Accounting fraud and Ponzi schemes are nothing new,4° which should prompt
reflection on how such swindling is still possible today. But collective anger can
impede calm deliberation and pursuit of sensible resolutions, with the mass media
stoking public resentment through words and pictures. There was, for example,
Enron chairman Ken Lay advising employees to buy corporate stock, when, in
36. See, e.g., Dick Thomburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The
Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 Am. CRmI. L. REv. 1279, 1279 (2007) (arguing that
corporate crime should be subject to civil and regulatory forums rather than criminal punishment).
37. Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 425-26 (1963).
38. Id. at 436.
39. Compare DANIEL FiSCEEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MuIKEN AND HIs FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION (HarperBusiness 1995), and HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (The Free
Press 1966), with STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME (Oxford University Press 2006).
40. "Generically, a Ponzi scheme is a phony investment plan in which monies paid by later investors are used
to pay artificially high returns to the initial investors, with the goal of attracting more investors." Alexander v.
Compton, 229 F.3d 750, 759 n. (9th Cir. 2000).
The term 'Ponzi scheme' is derived from Charles Ponzi, a famous Boston swindler. With a capital
of $150, Ponzi began to borrow money on his own promissory notes at a 50% rate of interest
payable in 90 days. Ponzi collected nearly $10 million in 8 months beginning in 1919, using the
funds of new investors to pay off those whose notes had come due.
United States v. Masten, 170 F3d 790,797 n.9 (7th Cir. 1999).
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fact, he knew the company was in distress and Lay himself was vigorously
converting stock to cash.4 1 The reports about Madoff also seem exasperating, like
the roundtable interview where he made the offhanded claim that it would be
impossible for major securities fraud to go undetected.42
In the end, Madoff was right: his wrongdoing was eventually discovered - but
not before billions of dollars were lost. With business crime of this magnitude, the
most powerful images tend to be those of innocent individuals harmed by the
wrongdoing and its revelation, investors whose retirement funds vanished, and
company employees who lost their jobs. Their stories can be heart-wrenching, and
when a critical mass of public outrage is reached, government action might look
like a foregone conclusion. In the aftermath of Enron's meltdown and other
corporate scandals, Congress passed the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act by nearly
unanimous vote (423-3 in the House, 99-0 in the Senate). Public and political
outrage drove the legislation, as House sponsor Michael Oxley quipped: "Sum-
mary executions [for corporate executives] would get 85 votes in the Senate right
now."43 Among other things, Sarbanes-Oxley makes senior executives individu-
ally responsible for financial reports, backed by new crimes and harsher penalties.
Some might also expect a tough government response to prevent the type of
investment scams uncovered in recent times. On June 29, 2009, the trial court
doled out a 150-year sentence for Madoff, whose wrongdoing the judge described
as "extraordinarily evil," "not merely a bloodless crime that takes place on paper,
but one that takes a staggering toll."44 One newspaper foresaw Madoff suffering
"everlasting consumption in the jaws of the Devil, ' 45 while another suggested that
his crimes would "put an entire era on trial."4 6
In truth, though, Bucy's proposed affirmative defense would have little rel-
evance for Ponzi schemes and similar financial stratagems (e.g., pyramid scams).
4 7
41. See, e.g., Paula Dwyer, The SEC to Top Execs: Read the Fine Print, BusNESS WEEK, July 26, 2004
(explaining that Lay urged workers to follow his lead and buy Enron stock although he was dumping far more
stock than he publicly acquired).
42. See, e.g., Factbox: Bernard Madoff quotes, REUTERS, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/
idUSTRE4BGOC 120081217 ("In today's regulatory environment, it's virtually impossible to violate rules..., but
it's impossible for a violation to go undetected, certainly not for a considerable period of time.").
43. Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Reality Check: It's Business as Usual, COMMON DREAMs NEWS
CENTER, July 18, 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0718-07.htm (quoting Rep. Michael Oxley).
44. Bernard Madoff Sentenced to 150 Years In Prison, Department of Justice Press Release, June 29, 2009,
available at http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressre1109/nyfed62909.htm
45. Editorial, Burn, Bernie, Burn, N.Y. DALY NEws, June 30, 2009.
46. Diana B. Henriques, Madoffls Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TuAEs, June 30, 2009.
47. Although it is possible for a Ponzi scheme to exist within an otherwise legitimate enterprise, such scams
tend to be part of the core "business" conducted by owner-management rather than the misconduct of a rogue
employee. For instance, in order for an agreement to constitute an "investment contract" subject to federal
regulation, an investor must be "led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."
S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). Implicit within this definition is active marketing and
promotion of the investment scheme, as well as the "undeniably significant ... essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise." S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
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Moreover, the legislative response to the Enron et al. fiasco might prove to be an
exception. It has been suggested that white-collar offending is less likely to incite
"moral panics, 48 a social phenomenon of public fear and anger that can trigger
momentous legislative and enforcement activity.49 And, of course, not all white-
collar crime involves corporations, though they often get painted with the same
broad brush. But regardless of whether the spate of financial wrongdoing inspires
more penal provisions and harsher punishments, and despite the unfairness of
associating such misconduct with all of corporate America, the current environ-
ment hardly seems conducive to the enactment of a new defense for corporations.
For instance, recent multi-billion dollar federal bailouts did not sit well with many
citizens, given A.I.G.'s use of public largesse to pay executive bonuses and
General Motors' bankruptcy after the cash infusion. Besides, the current Adminis-
tration has signaled a desire for a stronger regulatory regime, and it is not at all
obvious that the Justice Department (and its state analogues) would support a
legislative narrowing of corporate liability, even if cast as a limited trial defense
where the corporation bears the burden of proof.
IV. CORPORATE REHABILITATION
If change is to come, it may well have to take place within the existing
framework of corporate crime, with a particular focus on the question of sentenc-
ing. After discussing various arguments about business wrongdoing and conclud-
ing that corporate criminal liability is justifiable, Professor Peter Henning lays out
an exceptionally thoughtful case for rehabilitation as the ultimate goal of any
punishment imposed on the offending organization.50 Once the responsible employ-
ees are fired and restitution provided to the identifiable victims, "the issue should
1973). In any event, it would be virtually impossible to demonstrate the existence of an effective compliance
program if a Ponzi scheme ripened within a corporation.
48. See Michael Levi, Suite Revenge?: The Shaping of Folk Devils and Moral Panics about White-Collar
Crimes, 49 BRIT. J. CRIINOLOGY 48, 63 (2009); cf. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS
(Routledge 1972). In contrast to street crime, business offenses are usually concealed in private transactions, lack
physical danger to direct victims and others, tend to occur over extended periods of time, and are committed by
people who look "like us" (i.e., stereotypical ordinary citizens). As criminologist Michael Levi recently wrote,
"white collar criminals are more like Faustian devils who, when revealed as large-scale lawbreakers, being central
to the social structure, are also threats to our moral selves." Levi, supra, at 65. Only on occasion is the white-collar
criminal perceived as a "folk devil," generating a moral panic in society and rash, sometimes draconian action by
politicians. Ken Lay et al. are the exception,,their misconduct having prompted a stem congressional response via
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. But more often than not, Levi argues, white-collar criminals elude the moniker of folk
devils engaged in evil deeds. See id. at 63. The case of Bernie Madoff may prove to be an outlier. Although he was
demonized in the public, the culmination of Madoff's criminal case was not as climactic as might have been
expected. It was quite telling, for example, that news of his virtual life sentence received second-billing to the
ongoing coverage of Michael Jackson's death. See, e.g., Frank Rich, Bernie Madoff Is No John Dillinger, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 5, 2009, at WK8. Whether the Madoff affair prompts legislative change is yet to be seen.
49. Levi, supra note 48, at 65.
50. See generally Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM.
CRtM. L. REv. 1417, 1421-22 (2009).
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be what steps should the organization take to reform itself to limit the possibility
that the wrongdoing will occur in the future., 51 According to Henning, the
existence of a compliance program is. not always enough. Almost all publicly
traded companies have some type of compliance regimen, informed by a plethora
of rules on instituting an effective program. Yet some organizations continue to
violate the law, often as a result of a dysfunctional corporate culture. In such
situations, Henning suggests that the criminal justice system can promote the
restructuring of a corporation toward an ethos of respect for legal obligations. This
does not necessarily require a conviction, as prosecutors can employ their vast
charging discretion as a prod for change. The mere threat of criminal charges and
the potential consequences at trial may encourage corporations to enter into
"deferred prosecution agreements" (DPAs) and "non-prosecution agreements"
(NPAs), which can require extensive internal renovations overseen by a monitor of
the government's choosing.52
This criminal justice-based approach to corporate reform is not without its
problems. As Henning notes, rehabilitation as an aim of punishment fell into
disrepute several decades ago. He mentions a number of reasons for the downfall
of the rehabilitative ideal, such as sentencing disparities among similarly situated
offenders, but suggests that none apply in the context of corporate crime. One
objection might be relevant to public opinion, however - the lack of moral censure.
When applied to an individual, rehabilitation might appear to be a boon for the
offender rather than a form of punishment. Because the crime is deemed the
product of a disorder rather than an act of free will, there may be no condemnation
of wrongdoing, no call for offender accountability, and no affirmation of the
victim's right not to be victimized. Like other grievances against rehabilitation,
this criticism may be totally inapposite to organizational punishment. How the
public will view corporate rehabilitation, however, remains to be seen.
-Another concern is the aforementioned potential for prosecutorial abuse, epito-
mized by a DPA that resulted in a corporation endowing a law school chair at the
U.S. Attorney's alma mater.53 As of now, there are no guidelines as to the propriety
and specific terms of a DPA or NPA, nor are there any limits as to the time length
and intensity of prosecutorial oversight of an agreement. In essence, a corporation
may be held in receivership by a prosecutor, who becomes a sort of super-CEO or
board chairman with the power to seek indictments should he become dissatisfied.
Needless to say, the idea of state control of a private enterprise is problematic in an
51. Id. at 14.
52. See id. at 16 ("[By] focusing more on prospective questions of corporate governance and compliance, and
less on the retrospective question of the entity's criminal liability, federal prosecutors have fashioned a new role
for themselves in policing, and supervising, corporate America."); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007).
53. See Henning, supra note 50, at 1432 (discussing scandal in which Bristol-Myers Squibb endowed a chair at
the law school alma mater of the United States Attorney negotiating the agreement); see also Stephanie Martz,
Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 45.
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economy premised on free markets, even more so if the predicate crime is of
doubtful validity. All of this points to the question of whether prosecutors, as
partisans in an extremely competitive and sometimes politicized adversarial
process, should effectively serve as adjudicators of corporate guilt and punish-
ment. Henning may be right that corporate rehabilitation is the appropriate
justification for punishment, but the theory that reigns in any given case will be
that of the prosecutor, who may believe that deterrence or retribution or expressive
condemnation is- the correct rationale. What is more, the specter of self-interested
decision-making looms large, where cases are pursued and agreements reached
based not on the best interests of victims and society at large but on the personal
benefits that accrue to prosecutors. The agency costs of prosecutorial discretion in
this area are different only in degree rather than in kind from those associated with
non-corporate crime, with the basic question staying the same - cui bono, "for
whose benefit." But the possible rewards for prosecutors, in terms of publicity and
career advancement, are far greater when the target is a major corporation.
This leads me to ponder whether the above problems might be alleviated by
integrating principles of restorative justice into Henning's rehabilitative model of
DPAs and NPAs. Restorative justice can be described as an approach to punish-
ment that brings together all relevant parties to a crime in a group decision-making
process to reach a mutually agreeable outcome. 4 In general, the participants are
those who have been directly affected by the crime or have a cognizable stake in its
resolution: victims, offenders, family members, law enforcement representatives,
and others within a "community of interest."55 Somewhat like alternative dispute
resolution practices in private law, restorative justice utilizes non-adversarial,
informal procedures, where victims and other stakeholders are provided the
opportunity to describe the harm that has been caused, to offer their views on the
offender and the source of wrongdoing, and to put forward their ideas about
punishment. Typically, a case is referred to a restorative justice process as a form
of diversion from prosecution or as a condition of probation after an accepted
guilty plea. Through mediated dialogue and negotiation, premised on collabora-
tive, consensus-based decision-making, the process seeks participant agreement
on an appropriate resolution. One could imagine a DPA or NPA calling for, inter
alia, corporate leadership (e.g., executives and board members) to take part in a
restorative justice process and to fulfill any obligations under the resulting
participant agreement.
Myriad details about corporate restorative justice in the U.S. would need to be
fleshed out. Among other things, restorative justice can be separated into distinct
54. See, e.g., Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An Unexpected Benefit
of Booker?, 37 McGEoRGE L. REv. 787, 789 (2006); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic
and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRiuME & JusT. 1, 5 (1999).
55. Allison Morris & Warren Young, Reforming Criminal Justice: The Potential of Restorative Justice, in
RESTroRATivE JuSnCa: PfmosoPity To PRAcncE 11, 14 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2000).
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conceptions, substantive and procedural, and various processes can be described as
restorative.56 For instance, discrete crimes like burglary are amenable to the
best-known restorative practices: victim-offender mediation, family group confer-
encing, and circle sentencing. But in many cases of corporate crime, the complex-
ity of wrongdoing, the large number of victims, and the difficulty of assessing
aggregate harm could require a different model, perhaps along the lines of a "truth
and reconciliation commission. 57 Unfortunately, the brevity of this response
precludes a thorough review of the theory and practice of restorative justice. There
is voluminous literature on the topic,58 however, including in-depth discussions of
restorative justice for corporate crime. In a series of works, Professor John
Braithwaite has marshaled evidence that restorative justice can reduce reoffending
by corporations. 59 Numerous factors may be at work here, including the non-
adversarial nature and open inquiry of restorative practices and, in particular, the
face-to-face meetings between corporate leaders and victims.
As compared to the typical process of reaching a DPA and NPA, which interpose
legal advocates and bear some resemblance to standard corporate deals, the
presence of actual victims and the articulation of the injuries they have suffered
may frustrate any attempt to neutralize or abstract away the offense. "[E]ven the
worst of corporate malefactors has a public-regarding self that can be appealed to,"
Braithwaite notes, "a self-categorization as 'responsible businessman,' for ex-
ample."6 Directly confronting the harm caused to victims may have a powerful
impact on a corporate executive, appealing to his positive self-image and motivat-
ing him to ensure against future victimization. Moreover, the crime can be
condemned and the offender held accountable through a process that allows
victims and other stakeholders to express their views on the appropriate outcome,
thereby incorporating their own theories of punishment into an agreed-upon
56. See generally Erik Luna, In Support of Restorative Justice, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 585, 586
(Paul H. Robinson, Stephen R Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009).
57. See Zvi D. Gabbay, Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm: Restorative Justice and
White-Collar Crime, 8 CARDozo J. CoNFLIcr RESOL. 421, 476-84 (2007) (describing a truth and reconciliation
commission that would focus on restoration and "making amends").
58. See, e.g., Brigitte Bouhours & Kathleen Daly, Books and edited collections on restorative justice,
1994-2003, Feb. 2004, http://www.voma.org/docs/bouhoursdaly-bibliog.pdf; see also Symposium, Restorative
Justice in Action, 89 MARQ. L. REv. 247 (2005); Fall 2003 Dispute Resolution Institute Symposium, Intentional
Conversations About Restorative Justice, Mediation and the Practice of Law, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 235
(2004); Symposium, The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 1 (2003).
59. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Corporate Crime and Republican Criminological Praxis, in CORPORATE
CRiME: CONTEMPoRARY DEBATES (F Pearce and L. Snider eds., 1995); JOHN BRArrHwArrE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (Oxford University Press 2002); Braithwaite, Assessing Optimistic, supra note 54,
at 53; See also Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 959 (1999);
Gabbay, supra note 57; Jerry Goodstein & Karl Aquino, And Restorative Justice for All: Redemption,
Forgiveness, and Reintegration in Organizations, J. OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (forthcoming 2009); Kristina
Murphy & Nathan Harris, Shaming, Shame and Recidivism: A Test of Reintegrative Shaming Theory in the
White-Collar Crime Context, 47 BRrr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 900, 900 (2007).
60. Braithwaite, Assessing Optimistic, supra note 54, at 58.
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resolution. 61 To be sure, the prosecutor will have the final say on the propriety and
content of a DPA or NPA with the corporation. But that decision may be less
susceptible to abuse against the background *of opinions expressed by those
affected by the crime and the resolutions they would find acceptable.
In the end, however, I am no more confident about the prospects for corporate
restorative justice in America than the feasibility of other proposed reforms offered
in this symposium. And in all fairness, each and every claim I have made here
could be countered in an iterative process of assertion and response. This is part of
what makes the topic so vexing. In fact, corporate criminal liability may serve as a
type of jurisprudential Rorschach test: what people see is a reflection of their own
position on punishment theory, for instance, and their attitude toward capitalism. 62
Nonetheless, the symposium contributions help elucidate the issues presented by
corporate criminality, clarifying in my own mind the various problems and
potential solutions. Henning's insightful discussion of corporate rehabilitation
should be taken to heart by federal prosecutors, judges and sentencing commission-
ers, forcing them to consider the necessary reforms to prevent future crimes.
Bucy's proposed affirmative defense offers an excellent model for striking a fairer
balance between the power of prosecutors and the prophylactic efforts of corpora-
tions. In turn, Beale has penned one of the sharpest arguments in favor of corporate
criminal liability, which may inspire, inter alia, a broader inquiry that extends
beyond our own borders. And Alschuler has made concrete the intuition of many
that something is wrong with the law, namely, that "attributing blame to a
corporation is no more sensible than attributing blame to a dagger, a fountain pen,
a Chevrolet, or any other instrumentality of crime. 6 3 I couldn't agree more -
although like Alschuler, I suspect that corporate liability may be a permanent part
of the American legal system. What we might hope for is greater clarity in the way
we view corporate criminal liability and the reform of its more discreditable
manifestations. The idea of punishing corporations may always be curious, but it
need not be unjust.
61. See, e.g., id. at 14-15 (discussing restorative justice approach to Australian insurance fraud case,
culminating in a resolution "grounded in the different kinds of theories the rich plurality of players involved in
this restorative justice process came up with").
62. In her first oral argument on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor seemed to challenge the
idea of corporations as bearers of constitutional rights. See Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (No. 08-205),
reargued Sept. 9,2009, p. 33, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/
08-205[Reargued].pdf (noting that it was "courts who created corporations as persons, gave birth to corporations
as persons, and there could be an argument made that that was the Court's error to start with ... [by imbuing] a
creature of State law with human characteristics"); See also Jess Bravin, Sotomayor Issues Challenge to a Century
of Corporate Law, WA.L ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at A19.
63. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1392.
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